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With the onset of the financial crisis, disentangling the effects of loan demand and supply in 
contemporary banking research has become vital for a proper assessment of supply-related banking 
shocks. These shocks may negatively affect the real economy through many channels, such as the 
lending channel of monetary policy transmission, the bank risk-taking channel or the evaluation of 
macroprudential policy efficiency. All these rely on separating the two lending components. Empirical 
identification has largely relied on the use of demand-related fixed effects, which has also been 
applied in several analyses within this Symposium.1 Morales-Acevedo and Ongena (“Fear, Anger and 
Credit. On Bank Robberies and Loan Conditions”) apply such a control for loan demand at the industry 
level in order to assess the impact of bank branch robberies in Colombia on subsequently approved 
loans and their conditions, conjecturing that such a stressful event experienced by loan officers leads 
to temporarily emotionally-motivated lending decisions. Agarwal et al. (“Commodity Prices and Bank 
Lending”) use this method to establish how reductions of commodity prices affect lending in 
developing countries, or more specifically, which bank characteristics lead to a stronger transmission 
of the global price shock through loan supply. Their investigation is based on loan application data for 
Uganda. 
 
The application of firm fixed effects specifically as a control for unobserved firm heterogeneity 
assigned to loan demand has been pioneered in the work of Gan (2007) and Khwaja and Mian (2008). 
This approach requires information on bank-firm exposures and relies on firms that borrow from at 
least two banks. Otherwise, firm demand would be misspecified in a regression of the following form: 
 
∆𝐿𝑏𝑓 = 𝛼𝑓 + 𝛽𝑏 + 𝜀𝑏𝑓 , (1) 
 
where ∆𝐿𝑏𝑓 denotes loan growth at the bank-firm level, while 𝛼𝑓 and 𝛽𝑏 are firm and bank fixed 
effects serving as proxies for loan demand and supply, respectively. The error term is denoted by 𝜀𝑏𝑓. 
 
The equation above has first been applied in contexts where an exogenous shock affects loan supply, 
hence the empirical setup corresponds to a difference in differences approach comparing pre- and 
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CEPR; and the University of Zürich, SFI, KU Leuven and CEPR, respectively. The Symposium on Contemporary 
Banking Research was edited by Steven Ongena and Wes Wilson. We thank Wes Wilson for valuable comments 
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1 Our note focuses on those papers of the Symposium that apply fixed effects specifically to separate loan 
demand from loan supply. Several other papers use fixed effects that account for (un)observable determinants 
affecting the main relationship under analysis in a cross-country bank-level empirical setting. Fatica et al. 
(“Banks, Debt and Risk: Assessing the Spillovers of Corporate Taxes”) apply bank-group, year and country-year 
fixed effects in their assessment of the impact of corporate tax reforms on debt and equity choices. Qi et al. in 
this Symposium (“The Travels of a Bank Deposit in Turbulent Times: The Importance of Deposit Insurance Design 
for Cross-Border Deposits”) use country-pair and year fixed effects when estimating the effect of deposit 
insurance on bilateral cross-border deposits. Based on data from a single retail bank, Brown et al. (“Numeracy 
and On-the-Job Performance: Evidence from Loan Officers”) include branch and time fixed effects when 
accounting for numeracy differentials across loan officers. 
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post-shock changes in lending. Gan (2007) studied how a decrease in asset prices affected loan supply 
due to real estate exposures of banks in Japan. Khwaja and Mian (2008) explored the effect of 
unannounced nuclear tests in Pakistan, which affected liquidity of banks due to reductions of their 
dollar-denominated deposits. In such a case, the loan demand control is not necessarily time-varying. 
As more granular datasets became available (e.g., proprietary credit registers of central banks), the 
time dimension was added to the analysis of lending shocks, hence firm-time fixed effects were used:  
 
∆𝐿𝑏𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑓𝑡 , 
 
(2) 
where the term ∆𝐿𝑏𝑓𝑡 denotes loan growth at the bank-firm-time level, while firm-time and bank-time 
fixed effects are represented by 𝛼𝑓𝑡 and 𝛽𝑏𝑡, respectively. The error term is 𝜀𝑏𝑓𝑡. One example of the 
use of such an approach is Jiménez et al. (2012), who analyse the strength of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism through the restrictive effect of higher short-term monetary policy rates on 
loan supply.  
 
An additional benefit of using highly-disaggregated bank-firm data, besides incorporating loan supply 
and demand controls in form of bank-time and firm-time fixed effects, is also to account for 
endogenous matching of banks and firms (i.e., bank-firm fixed effects). Examples of such an approach 
can be found in Paligorova and Santos (2017) or Altavilla et al. (2018). The estimation procedure in 
that case translates into the following equation: 
 
∆𝐿𝑏𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑏𝑓 + 𝜀𝑏𝑓𝑡 
 
(3) 
Compared to Equation 2, the additional explanatory variable are bank-firm fixed effects 𝛾𝑏𝑓, used to 
control for any unobservable bank-firm heterogeneity. While the use of multiple-bank firms is a 
prerequisite for the application of the estimation procedure described above, the question arises 
whether such an empirical setup suits either the sample, or the context under analysis. As Altavilla et 
al. (2018) show, using a harmonised collection of credit registers from several EU countries, the share 
of firms with more than one borrowing relationship in the total number of firms may vary between 
10% and 46%. At the same time, the share of such firms in total borrowing is relatively higher, between 
41% and 87%, as larger firms typically borrow more and from several banks. However, these 
percentages point to the possibility that the methodology above might not apply to a significant 
proportion of firms and does not capture the entirety of the lending portfolio of banks. Keeping in 
mind that single-bank firms might differ from multiple-bank firms, especially in terms of age or size, it 
is not clear whether the implications of the lending channel have similar (or identical) effects on the 
real outcomes for these firms. Furthermore, regulators might be particularly interested in the small 
firms that may be dropped from the analysis when relying upon multiple-bank firms. 
 
Degryse et al. (2019) introduce and verify a novel method that incorporates single-bank firms into the 
analysis of the effects of supply shocks on borrowing firms. In their sample of firms incorporated in 
Belgium, the authors establish that 84% of firm-time observations belong to firms that do not have 
multiple-bank relationships, representing 46% of the lending portfolio of banks. They also find that 
single-bank firms are systematically different from multiple-bank firms. Firms with just one borrowing 
relationship are on average younger, smaller (in terms of total assets and the number of employees), 
have more tangible assets and borrow smaller loan amounts. Based on these findings, the authors 
explore an alternative to a firm-level demand control: firms are clustered into industry-location-size 
bins, under the assumption that such similar firms have identical loan demand. Therefore, firm-time 
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(FT) fixed effects can be replaced by industry-location-size-time (ILST) fixed effects, and would 
incorporate almost the entire sample of bank-firm relationships. Equation 2 above then becomes: 
 
∆𝐿𝑏𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽𝑏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑓𝑡, 
 
(4) 
i.e., firm-time fixed effects (𝛼𝑓𝑡) have been replaced by industry-location-size-time fixed effects 
(𝛼𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑡), while the dependent variable (loan growth; ∆𝐿𝑏𝑓𝑡) remains defined at the bank-firm level. To 
verify whether such an alternative demand control is viable, in the first step the authors compare how 
the inclusion of ILST effects instead of FT effects works in the sample of multiple-bank firms. Based on 
results from Equations 2 and 4, the estimated supply shocks (?̂?𝐹𝑇 and ?̂?𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑇) are compared. If the 
alternative demand control has led to misspecification, the two supply shock estimates will vary 
substantially. However, the estimates are highly correlated. 
 
In the second step, the authors include single-bank firms into the analysis. As the two demand controls 
can be assumed to be very similar (as verified in the first step), the difference in the two supply shock 
estimates can be attributed to variation in supply shocks faced by multiple-bank firms and single-bank 
firms. Indeed, the month-by-month correlation between ?̂?𝐹𝑇 from the first step and ?̂?𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑇 from the 
second step varies significantly, in the range between 0.23 and 0.94. This finding indicates that the 
exclusion of single-bank firms from the analysis of supply-related shocks might lead to biased 
estimates of the strength of such shocks, but also of their real effects. The authors corroborate such 
a conclusion by showing that the negative effects of loan supply shocks on growth in financial debt, 
total assets, fixed assets and operating margin of firms are only properly identified with supply shocks 
estimated using both single- and multiple-bank firms. 
 
Other firm characteristics (age, riskiness, availability of internal resources) have been considered in 
the creation of the alternative demand control, but the loan supply estimates obtained with the 
combination of industry affiliation, location and size as a demand control have exhibited most 
similarity with the standard bank-time fixed effects. It is also encouraging that such readily available 
firm features showed most relevance, as this might enable other researchers to apply such an 
approach. On the other hand, finer and more detailed clustering of firms might saturate the 
specification and lead to losses in the number of observations, hence it should only be applied if it 
does not disable appropriate disentanglement between loan demand and supply.  
 
While Degryse et al. (2019) show more formally that firm fixed effects may be substituted with 
alternative loan demand controls using a clustering procedure, other papers have proceeded with a 
direct application of such an approach in their empirical analyses. De Jonghe et al. (2019) use identical 
industry-location-size clustering to show that less risky firms or firms operating in sectors in which 
their borrowing bank is more present or specialized are better shielded from banks’ funding shocks. 
Acharya et al. (2018; 2019) cluster firms according to their country of incorporation, industry affiliation 
and credit quality rating to assess the real effects of the sovereign debt crisis and of the subsequent 
unconventional monetary policy measure in form of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
program. In this Symposium, Agarwal et al. (2019) cluster firms in the same district and industry. 
Morales-Acevedo and Ongena (2019), combine firm size, age, number of borrowing relationships, 
existence of prior arrears, credit quality rating and industry affiliation to form firm clusters. 
 
The empirical literature also offers other improvements to the well-established use of firm fixed 
effects. Amiti and Weinstein (2018) argue that an equilibrium condition should be respected when 
demand and supply shocks are estimated: demand equals supply, hence no increase/decrease in 
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demand can result in an observable bank-firm relationship without a corresponding increase/decrease 
in supply, and vice versa. The relevance of one lending component for the other is captured using 
weights: in the universe of bank-firm relationships, how relevant is any firm in the lending portfolio of 
a bank, and how important is any bank in the borrowing portfolio of a firm? Tielens and Van Hove 
(2017) formally show that the application of these adding-up constraints in an empirical setup with 
multiple-bank firms is equivalent to using a weighted least squares procedure, with the relevance of 
each firm for a given bank as the weight. 
 
While the use of firm(-time) fixed effects or alternative demand controls enables separation of loan 
demand and supply, it also relies on the bank-firm relationships that have already been established 
and can be observed. In fact, the initial step in the lending process are loan applications, which might 
be approved or rejected. Such information may be contained in credit registers (e.g., Agarwal et al., 
2019; Jiménez et al., 2012), but it can also be found in firm-level surveys, such as the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. Jiménez et al. (2014) use loan application and approval 
data from the Spanish credit register to analyse whether the environment of low monetary policy 
rates induces more risk-taking by banks. Popov and Udell (2012) rely on loan rejections from BEEPS to 
identify credit-constrained firms and infer the effects of bank capital shocks on borrowing firms. 
 
As can be seen from the discussion above, highly disaggregated data may be helpful in disentangling 
loan supply from loan demand, but the specificity of the context under analysis might hinder 
researchers from making broadly applicable conclusions. Harmonisation and unification of credit 
registers alleviates such concerns and has been the focus of the AnaCredit project by the European 
Central Bank (ECB). The first empirical results are already becoming available based on the 
consolidated credit register of 15 European Union members (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain). 
Altavilla et al. (2018) rely on this data to show that ex-ante more vulnerable banks, i.e. banks with a 
higher share of non-performing loans, engage in risk-taking behaviour. Supply of loans to riskier firms 
can be reduced through centralized banking supervision under the Single Supervisory Mechanism, but 
this mitigation effect is evident only in stressed economies of Italy, Portugal and Spain. The risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy in stressed countries is also weakened due to supranational supervisory 
efforts. Further research using this dataset is surely under way, and will provide deeper insights into 
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